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Abstract
We analyze foundational consequences of recently announced loop-
hole free tests of violation of Bell’s inequality. We consider two inter-
pretations of these remarkable experiments. By the conventional one
“Einstein was wrong and Bohr was right, there is spooky action at a
distance, quantum realism is incompatible with locality.” However, we
show that it is still possible to treat quantum mechanics without ap-
pealing to nonlocality or denying realism. We hope that this note will
attract attention of the experts in quantum foundations and convince
them to come with their own comments on the final Bell’s test.
1 Introduction
It finally happened! In 2015 three world’s leading experimental groups work-
ing on foundational aspects of quantum mechanics (QM) announced (prac-
tically simultaneously) that they had performed the loophole free tests of
violation of the Bell inequality [1], [2]: the groups of Ronald Hanson (Delf
University of Technology) [3], Anton Zeilinger (University of Vienna) [4] and
Linden Shalm (NIST, Boulder) [5]. This is definitely a great event in quan-
tum foundations; the more so because it took so long to evolve from the
pioneer experiment of Alain Aspect [6] to these final Bell’s tests. (Besides,
some experts in quantum foundations presented the arguments, in the spirit
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of Heisenberg uncertainty principle, that the locality and detection loopholes
could not be closed in one experiment [7]).
I was surprised to see that this event did not generate a new wave of the
quantum foundational enthusiasm, neither in the quantum community nor in
general mass-media (even oriented to popularization of science).1 One of the
reasons for this rather mild reaction is that, as was already mentioned, the
result was commonly expected.2 A similar reason is that the Bell inequality
has already been widely “sold”. In literature and talks the Bell argument is
typically presented as if everything has already been experimentally proven;
scientists working on closing loopholes were considered merely as polishing
the famous Aspect’s experiment [6]. Those who are closer to quantum foun-
dations could additionally point that G. Weihs [8] contributed to complete
Aspect’s experiment by closing the locality loophole.
Therefore, it would be great if the recent publications [3]-[5] ignited a
serious discussion on the possible impact of this event of the realization of
the totally loophole free Bell test. Such a discussion is especially important
because conclusions presented in [3]-[5], see also comments on these tests in
[9], [10], present only a part of the wide spectrum of views on Bell’s argument.
Although the presented “conventional viewpoint” dominates in the quantum
community, it would be natural to represent other, so to say, singular, parts of
this spectrum of viewpoints, see, e.g., the recent comment of M. Kupczynski
[11].
We briefly remind the conventional viewpoint presented in [1], [2] and in
hundreds of articles and monographs, e.g., [12]-[14], [3]-[10]. It was finally
confirmed experimentally that
1. CV1: Einstein was wrong and Bohr was right;
2. CV2: there is spooky action at a distance;
3. CV3: quantum realism is incompatible with locality.
1The situation reminds me of what happened in mathematics after the famous Fermat
theorem had been finally proven. Mathematicians were definitely not able to “sell” this
great achievement, even in the scientific community; the test-question: who did prove the
Fermat theorem?
2One very famous experimenter whose group at that time worked hard to perform a
loophole free Bell’s test told me that he would be really excited if in this test the Bell
equality would not be violated...
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The views of those who disagree with the presented “conventional position”
are characterized by the high degree of diversity [15]-[26]. Therefore I shall
not try to elaborate on some common “non-conventional viewpoints”, but
present only my own position [25]:
1. NCV1: both Einstein and Bohr were right;
2. NCV2: there is no need in spooky action at a distance;
3. NCV3: quantum realism is compatible with locality.
In section 2 I shall question the CV1-CV3 viewpoint and try to justify the
NCV1-NCV3 viewpoint; in particular, I confront the “action at a distance
interpretation” with the Copenhagen interpretation of QM. (It is surprising
that one may combine without cognitive dissonance these two interpreta-
tions.) Then to discuss the issue of realism in QM I appeal to its ontic-
epistemic analysis in the spirit of Atmanspacher and Primas [27]. From this
viewpoint, Bell’s argument can be treated as the conjecture that ontic states
can be identified with epistemic ones. We also discuss this conjecture by
appealing to the old Bild conception (Hertz, Boltzman, Schro¨dinger) about
the two descriptive levels of nature, theoretical and observational, see, e.g.,
[28] and chapter 1 of monograph [29]. Our conclusion is that the rejection
of Bell’s conjecture as the result of the recent experiments cannot be treated
as the impossibility to keep the realist viewpoint. There is neither need in
action at a distance.
Section 3 is started with the presentation of Kolmogorov’s interpretation
[30] of classical probability (CP) as the observational theory (describing the
epistemic states of nature). By Kolmogorov CP is a contextual theory assign-
ing probability spaces to experimental contexts, complexes of experimental
physical conditions. This position leads to the contextual representation of
the probabilistic structure of Bell’s experimental test [23], [25].
In section 4 I present my personal picture of future development of quan-
tum foundations, in “after Bell epoch”: from the total rejection of Bell’s
conjecture to novel studies on the two descriptive levels approach to QM.
In contrast to rather common opinion (see, e.g., Aspect’s paper [9] entitled
“Closing the door on Einstein and Bohr’s quantum debate” and Wiseman’s
paper [10] entitled “Quantum physics: Death by experiment for local real-
ism”), for me the final Bell test did not imply the total impossibility to “go
beyond quantum” [29]. The main message of this test is that the way to a
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proper subquantum model is more tricky than it was hypothesized by Bell.
3
2 Schro¨dinger, Einstein, Bohr, and Bell: phi-
losophy meets quantums physics
Typically the output of Bell’s argument (nowadays experimentally confirmed)
is formulated as QM is incompatible with local realism. Thus either one has
to reject the possibility of the realist description of quantum phenomena or
to imagine nonlocal reality of the Bohmian type which is even more exotic
and mystical than quantum surreality. Since Einstein dreamed for the realist
interpretation of quantum phenomena and he considered nonlocality as an
“absurd alternative” to realism, nowadays it is clear (for everybody, besides
a few outsiders, see, e.g., [29], [20], [16]-[26], [11]) that he was wrong and
automatically (as Einstein’s opponent) Bohr was right, see, e.g., [9]. In
general in the modern quantum community it is fashionable to be a follower
of Bohr.
2.1 Bohr versus Bell
First of all, I want to point to one of the main interpretational problems
of the conventional viewpoint on the output of Bell’s test, see CV1-CV3.
This is an attempt to present CV1-CV3 in a single package and consistently
with the Copenhagen interpretation of QM. However, none of the fathers of
QM, neither Bohr, Heisenberg, Fock, Landau, Pauli nor Einstein, could even
imagine that spooky action at a distance would be taken seriously in the
quantum foundations. Thus, one has to recognize that the modern nonlocal
feature of QM motivated by Bell’s argument has nothing to do with Copen-
hagen. One can agree or disagree with this statement, but in any event it
has to be presented and discussed.
Thus to be consistent one has to speak about the revolutionary changes
in quantum foundations generated by Bell’s argument and experimental tests
3 I also remark that even those who would not be convinced by my philosophic and
probabilistic arguments should agree that we have no choice - we have to go beyond
quantum, at least to solve the problem of merging of two great physical theories: QM (or
more precisely QFT) and general relativity.
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confirming it. The possibility of these changes was not even imagined by
earlier Copenhagenists.
One can still argue that “Copenhagenists were against realism” and,
hence, Bell’s test can be considered as supporting the Copenhagen position...
2.2 Realism: philosophy meets physics
Realism is a complex issue, both in physics and philosophy. One cannot
debate it without taking into account the recent progress in philosophical
studies. And I want to analyze Bell’s argument in the light of such studies,
namely, the ontic-epistemic viewpoint on physical reality, firmly established
in quantum foundations by H. Atmanspacher and Primas [27].
There are ontic states, assigned to physical systems as “they are”, and
epistemic states representing knowledge that observers gain from measure-
ments on physical systems. QM is about epistemic states. This is in com-
plete agreement with the Copenhagen interpretation of QM, especially Bohr’s
views.
It often escapes notice that the EPR-argument [31] was about ontic states;
it was directed to show that quantum states are epistemic states. For Ein-
stein, QM was incomplete in the sense that there should exists a finer descrip-
tion of physical processes in the microworld than given by QM. The states
of such a subquantum model are ontic states. Einstein and his coauthors did
not have any intention to treat the wave function ψ as the ontic state; for
them, it was the epistemic state representing knowledge which can be earn
from measurements.
This separation between the two descriptive levels is very important for
understanding the real tragedy of QM: misunderstanding about the issue
of completeness of QM, between Einstein and Bohr, see [31], [32]. As was
pointed out, Einstein’s incompleteness is so to say ontic incompleteness of
QM, but Bohr’s completeness is epistemic completeness of QM. Bohr in his
famous reply to Einstein [32] wanted to show that QM is complete at the
epistemic level. However, Einstein did not have doubts in epistemic com-
pleteness of QM. On the other hand, it seems that Bohr was not so strongly
against the possibility of creation of subquantum models; he simply con-
sidered such studies as meaningless, because for him physics was only about
epistemic states.4 (This picture of Bohr’s views resulted from my long discus-
4 N. Bohr as well as W. Heisenberg were strongly influenced by E. Mach who advocated
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sions with A. Plotnitsky, cf. [33]). However, it seems that Einstein and Bohr
did not understand that their debate could be resolved in purely philosophic
(ontic-epistemic) terms.
Now, let us consider Bell’s project from the philosophic viewpoint, by
using the ontic-epistemic approach. In philosophic terms, Bell’s conjecture
was that
O=E: Ontic states of quantum systems can be identified with epistemic
states.
Since the values of observables are assigned directly to the ontic states,
λ→ a(λ), (1)
these states also have to interpreted as the epistemic states. Here a is an
observable and the result of a measurement is determined directly by the
parameter λ. Hence, λ has to be considered as the epistemic state. At the
same time Bell treated λ as representing the state of reality as it is (λ has
no relation to context of measurement of a). Hence, it has to be considered
as the ontic state.
The final loophole free Bell tests demonstrated that this conjecture was
wrong (if there is no action at a distance, see NCV2).
However, this statement is not the same as to state that realism is incom-
patible with QM. The impossibility to identify two descriptive levels, ontic
and epistemic, is not rejection of the possibility of the realist description.
2.3 Impact of Bell’s test for Copenhagenists
For Bohr, only epistemic states had physical meaning. Of course, he did not
use this terminology, but his statements match it very well; for example [34]:
“This crucial point, which was to become a main theme of the discussions reported in
the following, implies the impossibility of any sharp separation between the behaviour of
atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define
the conditions under which the phenomena appear. In fact, the individuality of the typ-
ical quantum effects finds its proper expression in the circumstance that any attempt of
empiricism as the foundational principle of science. This principle is the cornerstone of the
Copenhagen interpretation of QM. At the same time it is not so common to refer to Mach
as one of fathers of this interpretation; in particular, because his orthodox empiricism
once had already led to aggressive denial of a basic and nowadays commonly recognized
physical structure - the atomic structure of matter.
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subdividing the phenomena will demand a change in the experimental arrangement intro-
ducing new possibilities of interaction between objects and measuring instruments which
in principle cannot be controlled. Consequently, evidence obtained under different experi-
mental conditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture, but must be regarded as
complementary in the sense that only the totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible
information about the objects.”
Therefore it seems that the problem of identification of ontic and epis-
temic states was of no interest for Bohr and “old Copenhagenists.”
2.4 Bild concept: Schro¨dinger versus Bell
We remark that the ontic-epistemic approach can be considered as the mod-
ern version of the old Bild-conception tradition (Hertz, Boltzmann and their
followers as well as Einstein) [28], [29], chapter 1. In QM this tradition was
especially strongly presented in views of Schro¨dinger who inherited this tradi-
tion from his teacher Exner. By the Bild-conception one has to separate two
descriptive levels, one is theoretical and another is observational. The latter
can be identified with the modernly used epistemic level. The theoretical
level, as preceding the observational level, can be coupled to the ontic level
of description. However, it seems that these notions cannot be completely
identified. The theoretical level was not about “reality as it is”, but about
its theoretical mathematical model.
Schro¨dinger emphasized the impossibility to identify these two descriptive
levels: theory and observations are not necessarily related in a term-to-term
correspondence and a certain degree of independence exists between them.
He also point out that already physicists of 19th century, e.g., Hertz, Boltz-
mann understood this well.5 As was emphasized by D’Agostino [28], p. 351,
Schro¨dinger called “the classical ideal of uninterrupted continuous descrip-
tion”, at both observables’ and theoretical levels, an “old way”, meaning, of
course, that this ideal is no longer attainable. He acknowledged that this
problem was at the center of the scientific debate in the Nineteenth and
Twentieth centuries as well, [35], p.24:
“Very similar declarations...(were) made again and again by competent physicists a
long time ago, all through the Nineteenth Century and the early days of our century...they
were aware that the desire for having a clear picture necessarily led one to encumber it
with unwarranted details,.’
5Boltzmann asserted that only one half of our experience is ever experience.
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2.5 De Broglie: hidden probabilities
The excellent presentation of De Broglie’s viewpoint on quantum measure-
ment and its consequences for Bell’s argument can be found in the paper of
G. Lochak [17]. We now present this measurement theory briefly by trying to
refine it from the presence of the physical guiding waves, De Broglie’s waves.
In his measurement theory De Broglie assigned the special value to the
position measurement: every physical quantity can be measured only via
the final detection of the position, e.g., localization of a detector produced
a click. The unitary equivalence of various representations in the Hilbert
space formalism is just a mathematical feature of the theory. To measure
the concrete physical quantity A, systems emitted by a source have to pass
an analyzer, e.g., PBS, and then approach the corresponding detector. Prob-
abilities determined by detectors after passing of the analyzer are called the
present probabilities; probabilities before the analyzer, corresponding to the
prepared pure state, are called the predicted probabilities. The main point of
De Broglie’s probabilistic considerations is that it is impossible to combine
the predicted and present probabilities straightforwardly, i.e., by using the
rules of the classical probability calculus, see section 3. In particular, it is
impossible to combine the predicted and present probabilities corresponding
to two arbitrary analyzers withing classical probability theory, by using the
joint probability distribution.
However, this fact (a simple consequence of the quantum formalism lead-
ing to “interference of probabilities”, see [25] for details) does not contradict
to a possibility to introduce hidden variables, because (according De Broglie)
their probability distribution is hidden, i.e., we have to consider the third type
of probabilities, hidden probabilities. The main point of De Broglie’s analysis
is that there is no reason to identify these hidden probabilities, probabilities
for ontic states with probabilities produced by QM, namely, the predicted and
present probabilities (which are epistemic probabilities). Thus similarly to
Schro¨dinger, Einstein, Atmanspacher, Primas and the author of this paper,
De Broglie and Lochak were against identification of ontic and epistemic
states and more generally their probability distributions (the latter is the
main point of a long series of publications of the author of this note, starting
with [36]).
Finally, we mention the guiding wave element of De Broglie’s picture.
The physical guiding wave appears as the element of the De Broglie’s on-
tic description of micro-phenomena, i.e., as one of variables representing the
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ontic state. We emphasize that the above scheme with hidden (ontic) and ob-
servational (epistemic) probabilities can be explored in general, i.e., without
claiming that a subquantum model has to be of the guiding wave type. Here
we cannot discuss even briefly the difference in views of L. De Broglie and
D. Bohm. We just remark that anybody who read De Broglie personally [37]
would never say that De Broglie double solutionmodel and so-called Bohmian
mechanics coincide up to the degree of mathematical rigorousness. In par-
ticular, we stress that the double solution model is local (as was emphasized
by De Broglie [37]) and Bohmian mechanics is nonlocal.
2.6 Einstein and Bohr
The above discussion about the ontic-epistemic philosophy and the corre-
sponding structuring the notion of realism demonstrated that the Bell argu-
ment has no direct relation neither to the position of Bohr nor Einstein and,
hence, it cannot be used to justify the position of one of them in contrast to
another. In particular, Einstein would say that he never tried to identify the
ontic states with the epistemic states. As was emphasized, Bohr and other
Copenhagenists were interested only in the epistemic states. Schro¨dinger
would say that he is not surprised that the coupling between the (possible)
theoretic and observational levels is not so straightforward, see (1), as in the
Bell-argument.
I hope that the statement NCV1 has been completely justified: both
Einstein and Bohr were right, but with respect to the corresponding levels
of description.
2.7 Bell versus von Neumann
We remind that Bell started his foundational project with hard critique [2]
of von Neumann’s theorem [38]. Nowadays the latter is practically forgotten,
not least because Bell’s critique. However, we can ask ourselves: Was von
Neumann’s theorem really so bad?
Von Neumann did not identify the ontic and epistemic states. He estab-
lished the special rules of correspondence between the two descriptive levels.
In principle, he proceeded in the Bild concept tradition: there are theoret-
ical and observational models and correspondence rules. Bell criticized von
Neumann’s image of a possible coupling between the theoretical and obser-
vational models and their critique was reasonable. In particular, by von
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Neumann the correspondence between ontic and epistemic quantities should
be additive,
a+ b→ aˆ+ bˆ, (2)
which seems to be unacceptable for incompatible observables.
However, from the philosophic viewpoint the sharp distinguishing be-
tween the two descriptive levels present in von Neumann theorem (person-
ally he called this statement “ansatz”) is preferable comparing with simple
identification of these levels. A follower of Einstein would say [25] that von
Neumann simply was not lucky to find the right correspondence rules. As was
emphasized in [25], the “no-go” activity in establishing the correspondence
between the two levels of description is totally meaningless, since there is an
infinite variety of possibilities to establish the rules of such a correspondence,
see, e.g., [29].
2.8 “Bell was wrong” community
It is useful to analyze from the ontic-epistemic viewpoint not only the position
of the conventional quantum (and more specifically quantum information)
community, see CV1-CV3, but even of “Bell was wrong” community. It
seems that the majority of opponents of the CV1-CV2 interpretation do not
understand the philosophic meaning of the Bell conjecture, O=E. Typically
one from the anti-Bell opposition tries to show that observational (epistemic)
probabilities can violate Bell’s inequality, or to show that the standard proofs
of the Bell inequality do not work, or to construct an epistemic (local) model
producing correlations violating Bell’s inequality. In more tricky studies there
is even a subquantum model and special rules coupling two descriptive levels,
but, of course, such a correspondence is more complex than conjectured in
O=E. Unfortunately, such studies are not treated from the double descriptive
viewpoint; in particular, the rules of correspondence between subquantum
and quantum models are not specified, cf., however, with [29].
Then it is claimed that “Bell’s theorem” (argument) was wrong. My
impression is that this was precisely the way of treatement of the Bell ar-
gument by the main anti-Bell gurus: L. Accardi, K. Hess and W. Philipp,
M. Kupczynski, H. De Raedt, K., Michielsen T. Nieuwenhuizen and par-
tially myself (although later I proceeded in the De Broglie-Lochak manner
by distinguishing hidden probabilities form epistemic). The claim “Bell was
wrong” acts as a red muleta used by Spanish matadors to make bulls an-
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gry and generates the strong critical feedback from the pro-Bell community.
This “Bell was wrong” position was not fruitful for quantum foundations,
it induced brutal debates (in particular, during the Va¨xjo¨ series of annual
conferences, 2001-2015). By understanding that Bell’s argument is based on
the O=E conjecture and that activity to test Bell’s inequality is directed to
check this conjecture we would escape these debates or least to make them
less brutal.
In short, it is definitely possible to construct local probabilistic models
violating the Bell inequality, but for such models the Bell conjecture O=E
is clearly wrong; in the same way the standard proofs of the Bell inequality
work only under the Bell conjecture.
3 Classical probability meets quantum physics
Bell’s argument is of the probabilistic nature and therefore it is natural to
analyze it from the viewpoint of foundations of probability theory. The latter
was formalized in the measure-theoretic framework by A. N. Kolmogorov [30]
in 1933. As any scientific theory, it was endowed with the corresponding
interpretation [30].
By Kolmogorov [30], see also [25] for discussions, any complex of physical
conditions C, experimental context6, determines its own probability space
PC - the system of events F ≡ FC and the probability P ≡ PC .
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Classical probability (CP) theory was designed to serve the epistemic
description. Here the positions of Kolmogorov and Bohr are very close. In
CP complementarity is expressed in assigning different probability spaces to
different contexts.8
6Here, see [25], the notion of “context” started to be in the use. It is important to point
out that here context represents “total experimental arrangement”. Thus contextuality is
understood wider than just dependence on measurement of a compatible observable. Our
viewpoint on contextuality matches better the views of Bohr than commonly used, e.g., in
discussions on Bell’s argument, “restricted contextuality”. We follow Bohr’s recommen-
dation that all experimental arrangement has to be taken into account.
7The system of events has the structure of Boolean σ-algebra and the probability is
the σ-additive measure normalized by 1. Here σ express countability: F is closed with
respect to countable unions and intersections and probability is countably additive.
8 One of the problems of modern CP is that this clear contextual message of Kolmogorov
is not emphasized in presentation of CP in modern textbooks; thus the young generation
of probabilists lost this original multi-context and multi-space picture of CP. Typically the
context-indexing is omitted. At the beginning it was done only to simplify notations and
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However, often we have to work with probabilistic data collected for a
family of contexts. Therefore CP has to provide some mechanism of embed-
ding of multi-contextual data in a single probability space. It is important
to emphasize that there are two main CP constructions of such embedding:
1. Marginal embedding: contextual probabilities are represented as marginal
probabilities for a single probability measure P.
2. Conditional embedding: contextual probabilities are represented as marginal
probabilities for some probability for a single probability measure P.
The first (straightforward) embedding was excellently realized by A. N. Kol-
mogorov in his famous theorem [30] about existence of the probability mea-
sure P (defined on the space of trajectories) for a stochastic process deter-
mined by its probability distributions for all finite sequences of instances of
time, Pt1...tn.
However, this construction can work only in special cases, for special
families of contexts. (Therefore Kolmogorov’s theorem about the existence
of a probability space for a stochastic process is so famous: he found such a
special (and very important) case.) It is well known in CP, since the work
of Boole, that probability distributions for random variables measured for
different contexts can be incompatible, i.e., it is impossible reproduce them
as marginal probabilities from the the single probability P [39]. 9 In fact,
the inequality providing the necessary condition of the existence of such P
derived by Boole coincides with Bell’s inequality; therefore some authors
even proposed to speak about the Boole-Bell inequality [23]. The complete
description of conditions of existence of the straightforward embedding of
contextual probabilities in a single probability space was presented in the
paper of Vorobj’ev [40] which contains all Bell’s type inequalities known in
quantum physics (as well as still unknown).
probabilists (at least representatives of the Soviet school) remembered well Kolmogorov’s
slogan: “no probability unrelated to experimental context”. When, say 15 years ago, I spoke
with two former students of Kolmogorov, A. N. Shiryaev and A. V. Bulinski, and tried to
teach them that CP is contextual, they immediately pointed to section 2 of Kolmogorov’s
book [30]. For them, it was totally evident that each experimental context generates its
own probability space. It seems that this rule is forgotten in the modern probabilistic
community.
9In the quantum foundational community this historical fact was “discovered” by I.
Pitowsky; in particular, he pointed to it in his talk at Va¨xjo¨-2001 conference. For many
years, I tried to advertise it for experts in quantum foundations, but without any success.
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We remark that the marginal embedding is based on the identification
of the ontic and epistemic descriptions. The epistemic probabilities for fixed
contexts are identified with the marginal probabilities with respect to the
probability distribution P which can be treated as the ontic probability. In
particular, the Kolmogorov theorem on the probability space for a stochastic
process can be applied only the assumption of the ontic-epistemic identifica-
tion; without this assumption one has to use theory of quantum stochastic
processes [41].
However, in contrast to QM, the “no-go” activity, the impossibility the-
orems about striaghtforward marginal embedding was not so popular in CP.
And it is clear why. There is widely explored the second embedding proce-
dure based on the identification of concrete contextual probabilities not with
marginal, but with conditional probabilities with respect to a single proba-
bility measure P. This is so-called randomization procedure. It is especially
important in statistics. We shall present it for the concrete multi-contextual
test - the Bell test.
3.1 Contextual probabilistic structure of Bell’s test
The considerations of this section are presented in the form of a formal math-
ematical model in the article [42].
How would Kolmogorov handle Bell’s argument? For Kolmogorov, it is
based on consideration of a few experimental contexts Cθiθ′j corresponding to
fixing the pairs of orientations of PBSs. There are a few probability spaces
corresponding to these measurement contexts. Experimental statistical data
collected for context Cθiθ′j has to be handled in its own probability space
PCθiθ′j
.
• Can Bell’s type inequalities be derived in such multi-space probabilistic
framework? Not!
• Would be Kolmogorov surprised by violation of Bell’s inequality for
multi-space data? Not at all! Moreover, he would be surprised if it
were not violated.
• Can one construct a single probability space representing all contexts
Cθiθ′j? Yes! Construction is known as randomization.
In short randomization can be described as follows:
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• A). Choose the probabilities of selections of contexts.
• B). Determine probability distributions for fixed contexts, PCθiθ′j
.
• C). Construct probability P serving for all experimental contexts: com-
bine probabilities for fixed contexts PCθiθ′j
with probabilities of context-
selections.10
This single probability measure P represents the multi-context experiment.
We stress that, for it, it is possible to derive Bell’s inequality, since the latter
is just a theorem of CP [25].
In this framework the probability distributions for fixed contexts PCθiθ′j
(which are obtained by experimenters as frequencies) appear as conditional
probabilities with respect to fixing selections of the parameters θi, θ
′
j (contexts
Cθiθ′j). However, there is no reason to hope that these conditional probabili-
ties and corresponding conditional quantities, e.g., correlations, would satisfy
Bell’s inequality, see [42].
In CP the magnitude ∆ of violation of Bell’s inequality can be treated
as the numerical measure of multi-space probabilistic structure of the exper-
iment. Thus ∆ represents the degree of contextuality (which is understood
a la Bohr as taking into account all experimental arrangement). What does
such contextuality mean from the QM foundational viewpoint? Contextual-
ity exhibits itself only the existence of incompatible contexts. Therefore ∆ is
also the measure of incompatibility-complementarity. From this viewpoint,
the experimental tests violating Bell’s inequality confirmed complementarity
not only for local observables, such as position and momentum or two spin
projections of a single electron, but even for nonlocal observables such as
projections of spins measured for a pair of electrons.
3.2 Kolmogorov versus Bell
As we have seen, the CP description of Bell’s test does not lead to revolution-
ary consequences in the form CV2, CV3. And this is completely clear why.
The above CP model of the probabilistic structure of Bell’s test is epistemic
- it takes into account randomness of selection of experimental contexts, i.e.,
10 This P is defined on the system of events F related to this randomized experiment;
it contains not only events related to observations for fixed contexts Cθiθ′j , but also events
of selections of these contexts.
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random generators used for this aim are also considered as measurement de-
vices. In principle, one can say that this is the end of the CP-story about
Bell’s test.
However, we can continue our discussion and represent its output in the
hidden variable form. The latter will be not real ontic hidden variables, but
so to say “epistemic hidden variables”.
CP teaches us that all random influences involved in the tests have to
incorporated into the model. Probabilist would consider [42] not the“Bell’s
map” (1), but a map of the form:
ω → a(ω), ω = (λ, λL, λR), (3)
where λL, λR are random parameters determining with some probabilities,
pL, pR outputs of random generators L and R which in turn determine set-
tings.11
Of course, not only random generators contribute to randomness gen-
erated by experimental equipment. There is a lot of randomness in PBSs,
in detectors, in optical fibers. This randomness also has to be taken into
account by modifying (3).
3.3 Classical probability, operational approach and Bell’s
argument
The above CP-analysis of Bell’s test motivates us to comment the represen-
tation of observables in the form (3) from the operational viewpoint which
is widely used in QM, e.g., [19]. By it there is a preparation procedure and
there is a measurement procedure. From the operational viewpoint, in Bell’s
considerations the preparation procedure is performed by the source of en-
tangled systems and the detection procedure by detectors. However, there
are, e.g., random generators determining the orientations of PBSs. They ex-
ist! One cannot simply ignore them. In the consistent operational approach
they have to taken into account. In the model represented by (3) they are
included in the preparation procedure. In fact, we follow De Broglie’s who
emphasized the role of analyzers in production of the present probabilities.
In the Bell test for photons PBSs are precisely De Broglie’s analyzers.
11In Bell’s test for the CHSH inequality each random generator selects a pair of angles
with probabilities pL(i), PR(j), i, j = 1, 2.
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3.4 With Ockham’s razor against nonlocality
We emphasize that we have not appealed to spooky action at a distance.
Contextuality 12 leads to violation of Bell’s inequality. This motivates NCV2
- “there is no need in spooky action at a distance”, although not rejection of
CV2. In principle, one can still play under the assumption CV2 - if one likes
spooky action and it helps her to create the consistent picture of the world.
However, there is no need in it. This is the good case to use Ockham’s razor,
see [43] for discussion.
This viewpoint, that by taking into account Kolmogorov probabilistic
contextuality of the Bell test one need not mention nonlocality at all, is
often criticized by piointing out that contexts Cθiθ′j are “nonlocal”, since
their are based on orientations of two spatially separated PBSs. However,
this classical nonlocality of spatial location of experimental equipment has
nothing to do with action at a distance.
Another point which was discussed in [7] is that in the Bell conjecture
the notion of “locality” is represented in very specific form of action at a
distance [2]. Where are there space-time variables? Action at a distance
locality is not at all Einsteinian locality of relativity theory. In principle,
one can try to couple “Bellian and Einsteinian localities” by taking into ac-
count the space-time dependence of correlations for entangled systems [44].
However, by proceeding this way we lose the simple prequantum-quantum
(ontic-epistemic) correspondence given by (1). The real space-time correla-
tions contain the at least contribution of media for signal propagation; then
one has to take into account dispersion and losses in this media, finally the
temporal structure of functioning of photo-detectors [45]. Thus the model
becomes epistemic; violation of Bell’s inequality by such correlations is not
surprising.
3.5 Quantum realism
Bell’s argument strongly supported anti-realist tendency in the quantum
community. It was very supporting for development of a variety of informa-
tion interpretations of QM - with two bright examples, the Zeilinger-Brukner
information interpretation [50] and Fuchs’ QBism [51], [52]. Nowadays a ran-
domly chosen representative of the quantum community would say with very
high probability (I account it as 99%) that realism and QM are incompatible.
12We understand it as determination of probability space by experimental context.
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I totally disagree with this position, see, e.g., my manifest [?]may be
naive, since at that time I was not so well educated in quantum foundational
issues). I repeat that the successful Bell’s test only rejects the straightforward
coupling (1) between the ontic and epistemic or more generally theoretic and
observation levels. Other maps can be constructed and the fact that we still
do not have a commonly acceptable map may just mean lack of imagination,
cf. with the famous citation of Bell [46], p. 15: “what is proved, by impossibility
proofs, is lack of imagination.”
However, realism discussed in section 2 is merely subquantum realism.
What is about, so to say, genuine quantum realism?
As was shown, CP modeling of physical experiments, including multi-
contextual experiments such as Bell’s test, does not lead to rejection of real-
ism. This is realism of experimental contexts and observations performed for
these contexts. This is precisely “physical realism”, defined as the statement
that the goal of physics is to study entities of the natural world, existing independently
from any particular observer’s perception, and obeying universal and intelligible rules, see
Auffe`ves and Grangier [47].
In my works this realism was treated as contextual realism of QM [25].
However, this terminology might be misleading, since in quantum founda-
tions contextuality is treated restrictively, as dependence on outcomes of
joint measurement of a compatible observable. We can also speak about
epistemic realism.
Finally, we remark that physical (contextual) realism matches well with
Bohr’s views.
One may even say that my contextual quantum realism (similarly quan-
tum realism of Grangier)13 is trivially and commonly acceptable. In fact,
this is not the case. And even if it were the case, it is very important to
emphasize realism of QM. The main problem is wide spread of identifying
of ontic and epistemic realisms. As was discussed, the impossibility of this
identification was interpreted as the impossibility to keep ontic realism (at
least locally). However, what is the most surprising this rejection of (local)
ontic realism is often represented as total rejection of realism in QM.
13To reconcile realism with QM, Grangier et al. also proceed in the contextual frame-
work [47]- [48]. However, they understood contextuality differently from me and from the
conventional viewpoint (as joint measurement with a compatible observable); for them,
context is not simply a complex of experimental physical conditions, see [47]- [48] for
details. Thus in this note we operate with three different types of contextuality.
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3.6 Va¨xjo¨ interpretation of quantum mechanics
The Va¨xjo¨ interpretation (VI) of QM is the realist statistical local and con-
textual interpretation of QM [53]-[55]. We shall briefly explain the meanings
assigned to these terms.
• The easiest for explanation is “statistical”. By VI probabilities are
interpreted statistically, i.e., they are related to ensembles of systems
and not individual systems.
• VI is local, simply no need even to rise the issue of nonlocality - in
complete agreement with Einstein who mentioned nonlocality is an
absurd alternative to realism.
• VI considers both realisms: “subquantum realism” (cf. Schro¨dinger,
Einstein, De Broglie, Lochak, Atmanspacher and Primas) and “con-
textual realism” (cf. Bohr, Auffe`ves and Grangier). The first one is
more challenging. We all still suffer of the lack of imagination... The
second one was clearly presented in section 3.5.
• VI is contextual, as any interpretation referring to two descriptive lev-
els, because any epistemic model is contextual as taking into account
all experimental arrangement.
4 Future
Recent successful tests for Bell’s inequality can be interpreted in various ways,
with two extremes, CV1-CV3 and NC1-NCV3, with numerous intermediate
interpretations. We can say that experimenters did their job and excellently.
However, the loophole free Bell tests should not be interpreted as finalizing
the century long discussion about the possibility to construct a theoretical
subquantum model coupled to the quantum observational model.
My interpretation is that the successful realization of Bell’s test confirmed
that
• We have to distinguish sharply two descriptive levels, theoretical and
observational (ontic and epistemic).
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• The correspondence between them can be very tricky (so, not so straight-
forward as in the Bell conjecture O=E).14
• Contextuality plays the crucial role in coupling of the two descriptive
levels.
Thus people looking for new insights on QM have to work hardly to find
the proper subquantum theoretical description by relaxing constraints on the
rules of correspondence between the two descriptive levels.
The final loophole free test says goodbye to the last hopes to identify the
observational and ontic descriptions. One has to look for more complex maps
f : SUBQM→ QM. (4)
This modeling has to be physically constructive, i.e., from the very be-
ginning one should put efforts not to beat some no-go theorem(s), but to
create a physically meaningful theoretical model15SUBQM endowed with a
physically meaningful map f. A partial experimental verification is a part
of this great project which successful realization would finally resolve (as I
believe!!!) the puzzle of QM.
Personally I still belief [29] in the possibility to construct a subquan-
tum model of the classical random field type, cf. Einstein and Infeld [56],
with nonlinear subquantum dynamics. This is also the main message of De
Broglie. Although, in contrast to Einstein and Infeld and the author of this
note, he considered not the ordinary say classical electromagnetic field, but
the so-called guiding field, this field is also physical. Thus one may hope
to measure it, in some way. Coming back to the Einstein-Infeld hypothesis
about classical subquantum field, we can say that, for a moment, experi-
mentalists can try to proceed to new measurement technologies which would
provide a possibility to measure characteristics of classical fields for quantum
systems, e.g., the polarization vector.
14Cf., e.g., with prequantum classical statistical field theory [29]. From my viewpoint
this model reproduce all probabilistic predictions of QM for one and bipartite systems;
for tripartite systems the representation of entanglement becomes extremely technical
and hardly interpretable; for quadripartite systems I was not able to resolve technical
difficulties.
15It may be surprising to hear this statement from a pure mathematician. However, in
contrast to physicists who are so excited by the ability of mathematics to model everything
in nature, I recognize that sometimes this ability looks like the ability of a prostitution
to serve all men’s desires. Thus a purely mathematical subquantum model is practically
valueless.
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